Abstract. In this paper, we propose a fair partner selection scheme for decode-and-forward cooperative relay networks based on auction theory. Modelling a single relay node as an auctioneer and multiple source nodes as bidders, the source nodes compete with each other by offering competitive prices to determine the recipient of the cooperative resources. To maximize the expected payoff, a closed-form Nash equilibrium strategy for each source node is derived over independent and identically distributed Rayleigh fading channels. Finally, numerical results and analysis verify the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
Introduction
Cooperative relaying techniques have recently achieved a great deal of popularity as an efficient way to mitigate fading in wireless networks, especially in situations where physical multiple antennas are difficult to deploy at a single terminal. Various cooperative protocols have been proposed in [1, 2] , such as amplify-and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), and estimate-andforward (EF). From the perspective of practical implementation, the DF cooperative protocol is an appealing relay strategy [3] .
In a cooperative relay network, partner selection is an important issue which affects the performance of the network significantly. Therefore, it is critical to design an effective partner selection scheme. The issues have been extensively studied in the literature [4] [5] [6] for DF relay networks. However, the vast majority of these works are based on the assumption that all terminals would be willing to participate in cooperative communication spontaneously. The assumption is unrealistic in autonomous, distributed, and flexible wireless networks, because cooperation consumes forwarders' extra resources such as power and bandwidth. Hence, it is necessary to design a mechanism to enforce cooperation for packet forwarding among greedy distributed terminals.
It is proved that the pricing-based mechanism [7] [8] [9] is an efficient method to stimulate cooperation among autonomous terminals, hence we introduce the approach. In pricing-based systems, a terminal is charged as source and reimbursed as relay. And the incentives to obtain virtual currency will make terminals willing to cooperate. In the pricing-based systems, there is an extensive literature on exploiting auction-based schemes for improving the efficiency of resource utilization. Mukherjee and Kwon in [10] developed a decentralized low-complexity cooperative partner selection scheme based on auction theory for dynamic ad hoc networks, which was proved to achieve outage performance close to a centralized partner selection scheme with complete channel state information (CSI). Works in [11] focused on the issues of resource allocation for distributed framework in cooperative networks, which were solved by mapping it into a multi-auctioneer multi-bidder power auction model. In [12] , the authors studied a cooperationbased dynamic spectrum leasing mechanism via multiwinner auction of multiple bands. Based on a secondprice auction mechanism, the primary users independently conduct auctions to determine winners who are then granted access to leased bands and prices for those bands. Zou et al. in [13] tackled the joint power and spectrum allocation problem under a cooperative cognitive radio framework, where primary users assist secondary transmissions and earn revenue, from selling the spectrum and cooperative power to secondary users. The trade between primary users and secondary users was modelled as an auction with two bundling commodities. However, the auction-based pricing method is still not involved to solve the distributed partner selection problems in the autonomous DF cooperative diversity system.
In this paper, we consider a DF cooperative relay network with a single relay node and multiple source nodes, in which the source nodes compete with each other to obtain the relay assistance. The problem is formulated as an auction game by making the relay node act as auctioneer and the source nodes act as bidders. In the game, the source nodes compete with each other by offering competitive prices. For independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading channels, the Nash equilibrium (NE) of each source node is derived in a closed form, based on which the expected payoff of the source node is also presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the system model. Section 3 applies auction theory to analyse the partner selection problems, and derive the NE bidding strategy and expected payoff for each source node. Simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme are presented in section 4. And it is followed by a conclusion in section 5.
System Model
As depicted in Figure 1 , we consider a DF cooperative network consisting of one relay node r and a set {1, , } N  of source-destination pairs. Each pair includes a source node and a destination node. The transmission of each data block can be divided into two phases [2] . In phase 1, each source node broadcasts its information to its destination and the relay node with power s P . In phase 2, the relay node r first decodes the received information from each source node. Let We assume that an ideal cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code has been applied such that the relay node can judge whether the transmitted symbol is correctly decoded or not.
Suppose that the channel between any two nodes of the network undergoes quasi-static Rayleigh fading such that the fading coefficient is constant for a given time frame. . Thus, we can obtain [3] , 
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Problem Formulation and Assumptions
Since the relay node r can only forward one source node's information in a given time frame, the following question needs to be answered: how should the relay node select a source node from S to achieve cooperative transmission? We address this issue by designing an auction-based distributed partner selection framework, in which the relay node and the source nodes act as auctioneer and bidders, respectively. Due to the fact that the source nodes should compete with each other to determine the recipient of the cooperative resources, the proposed scheme is an example of so-called competitive fairness.
Before introducing the auction game model, some fundamental assumptions used in this paper are presented. We assume that the source nodes compete with each other by submitting competitive prices (virtual currency), and each source node has enough virtual currency to take part in the auction. All the source nodes are risk neutral, i.e., they seek to maximize their expected profits. Moreover, the number of the competing source nodes M is a common knowledge. Before submitting a bid, each source node evaluates its performance of cooperative transmission and makes a valuation. 
Auction Game Model
There are two most prevalent auction forms, i.e., the firstprice auction and second-price auction [14] . As the firstprice auction is more familiar and even nature, it will be applied in this paper. In a first-price auction, the source node with the highest bid gets the relay node's resources and pays the amount he bids. Each source node i sS  submits a bid i b to the relay node, and given these bids, the payoff of i s is [14] max . 0 max
If there is a tie, the relay node goes to each winning source node with equal probability.
We can see that i s faces a trade-off while fixing the bidding behaviour of others. An increase in the bid will increase the probability of winning while, at the same time reducing the gains from winning. Thus, each source node should determine the bidding strategy  to maximize its expected payoff. The desirable outcome is called a NE, which is a bidding strategy *  such that no bidder wants to deviate unilaterally.
In the following we find the NE of each source node. As all the source nodes are symmetric, we have 
Since the source nodes are independent with each other, the probability that the bids of all other 1 M  source nodes are at most b is 
To maximize the expected payoff, the derivative of (7) with respect to b is zero:
, and thus we have
To simplify representation, we write () N Fx to denote [ ( )] N Fx . Integrating both sides, since (0) 0
where the second equality is obtained as a result of integration by parts. Thus, the NE is
Now, the symmetric NE of each source node is derived. Next, we will check its properties. The derivative of
Thus, the bidding function is indeed differentiable and increasing in v , which confirms our hypothesis. Moreover, it is obvious that, 
Obviously, m is increasing in v and decreasing in M .
Substituting (4) into (11) and (13), the closed-form NE and expected payoff for the source node i s can be derived respectively as follows:
where
Simulation Results
In this section, computer simulations are carried out to validate the derived analytical expressions. M increases, i m decreases and vice versa. Thus, the more source nodes whose information can be decoded successfully in the network, the less expected payoff a source node will achieve. This is consistent with our intuition: in the resource constrained scenario, it is more difficult for each competitor to win as the number of competitors increases, and thus the less expected profit will each competitor get.
Conclusion
In this paper, the partner selection problems for distributed cooperative wireless networks have been investigated, we first proposed an auction-based pricing scheme to stimulate cooperation, and then solved the problem of partner selection for DF cooperative relay networks based on NE strategies. The following question has been answered: How should a relay node fairly allocate its resources to one of the multiple competitive source nodes? The issue has been formulated as an auction game which was named as the first-price auction. In the game, the relay node and the source nodes act as auctioneer and bidders, respectively. For i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels, a closed-form NE of each source node has been derived. Then, based on the strategies, the expected payoffs for each source node have been given. Numerical results and analysis verified the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. 
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